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Abstract 
Many Eastern European countries are characterized by high wage inequalities and a 
relatively low proportion of labour force being employed on a part-time basis, yet 
there seem not be so far made any studies on the part time pay penalty. In this article 
we analyse whether there are any differences in the average wages of part-time and 
full-time employed in Estonia, a small Eastern European catching up economy. We 
use Estonian Labour Force Survey data from years 1997-2007; the part time wage 
gap is estimated by using Oaxaca-Blinder wage decompositions and propensity 
score matching. The results are quite different for males and females. For females 
the raw wage gap is in favour of part-timers. After taking into account various 
worker characteristics, the wage gap becomes even larger. For males the full-time 
raw premium exists, but it is to a large extent explained by the different labour 
market characteristics. 
Keywords: part-time work, pay-gap, Eastern Europe 
1. Introduction 
The incidence of part-time work has considerably increased in most developed 
countries in the past decades. There are several supply-side factors that have 
contributed to this tendency, most importantly the increase of the labour market 
participation of the females and the lengthening of the studying period of the youth. 
However, from the demand side, the structural changes that have occurred – most 
importantly the growth of the service sector - have favoured the triumph of the part-
time work. Despite the increase in part-time work, in most developed countries part-
time workers earn less than full-time employed.  
It is expressis verbis declared in the Republic of Estonia Employment Contracts Act 
that part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner in an 
employment relationship than comparable full-time workers
2 unless different 
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treatment is justified on objective grounds arising from the law or collective 
agreement
3. Moreover, an employer shall notify the representatives of the employees 
and a full-time worker in good time of the opportunity for part-time work and a part-
time worker of the opportunity to work for full-time, considering the qualification 
and skills of the worker. To conclude, institutional framework in Estonia is fully in 
accordance with European Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15
th December, 1997 
concerning the Framework Agreement on part-time work concluded by UNICE, 
CEEP and ETUC (“Part-Time Directive”) which is aimed to remove all forms of 
discrimination against part-time workers and facilitate the development of part-time 
and other flexible working arrangements. The aim of this study is to explore whether 
part-time workers are in unfavourable labour market position compared to full-time 
employed despite the equal treatment provisions stipulated in law and which 
demand and supply side factors explain the differences. 
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several directions. Firstly, although 
in developed countries full-time/part-time wage differences is a deeply surveyed 
topic, in Central and Eastern Europe (hereinafter also CEE) countries there exist to 
our knowledge no similar studies. It is interesting to analyze Estonia for various 
reasons. Estonia, as well as other Baltic States, is characterized by one of the highest 
wage inequalities among the European Union countries, in 2002 the value of the 9
th
to 1
st decile exceeded 4.5, while in most EU countries that was from 3 to 3.5 
(Employment in Europe 2005). That is in part caused by the institutional setting of 
the labour market like low minimum wages, low density of unions, low coverage of 
collective agreements. In such conditions, also the wage gaps between particular 
labour market groups (e.g. part-timers and full-timers) can be considerable. The 
earlier studies have, for instance, documented in the Estonian labour market large 
gender wage gap (see Rõõm and Kallaste 2005) and gap between the earnings of 
Estonians and Russians (Leping and Toomet 2008). 
We use for our analysis the data from the Estonian Labour Force Surveys from years 
1997-2007. The dataset is of fairly high quality and has been used in several 
internationally published studies. The data enables us to use both individual and firm 
specific information as explanatory variables. Moreover, the long time period 
covered – 1997-2007 – enables us to analyze the developments in time. Although the 
Estonian results are not one-to-one transferable to other CEE countries, this is a first 
attempt to map the situation in those countries.  
We use different econometric methods to analyze the wage gap between part-time 
and full-time employed. As it is the tradition in this literature, the wage gap is 
decomposed using the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions into the part explained by the 
differences in various labour market characteristics of part-time and full-time 
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employees, and the unexplained part. In addition to more traditional quantitative 
approaches the propensity score matching is employed. The comparison of the 
results of the different methods enables us to do more complex implications about 
the question in hand. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the 
existing literature on part-time/full-time wage gap and the possible explanations 
grounding wage differences. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 methods used. 
In section 5 we present the results of the empirical analysis. The last section 
concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
In many countries the raw pay gap between part-time and full-time employed is 
substantial. On adjusted basis (i.e. when taking into account ceteris paribus
condition) the differences are usually much more modest and in some cases do not 
exist (Aaronson, French (2004) for women in US; Rodgers (2004) for both men and 
women in Australia; Hardoy, Schone (2006) for women in Norway) or part-time 
wage premium is observed (Booth, Wood (2006) for Australia; O’Dorchai et al.
(2007) for Denmark). However, when comparing the scope of the adjusted part-
time/full-time wage gap in different countries, one should be cautious because 
differences in the definition of the part-time workers, variables used in analysis, 
group taken under observation (for example only married women) may make the 
comparison of results of the studies inadequate. 
There are several explanations provided in the literature that explain the wage 
penalty of part-time workers. To conclude, as summarized by Hirsch (2005), three 
most important factors determining an equilibrium part-time/full-time wage gap are 
heterogeneous skills, worker differences in preferred hours and employer 
preferences in working hours. 
Dual labour market theory. According to the dual labour market theory, “good” jobs 
which are characterized by high wages and bonuses are converged to the primary 
labour market while jobs in the secondary labour market jobs are low paid and 
provide few opportunities of self-development. The wage gap exists because part-
time jobs are disproportionally more converged to the secondary and full-time jobs 
to the primary labour market, i.e. the full-time jobs are (compared to part-time jobs) 
proportionally more often found in the sectors, occupations, geographic areas, etc 
where higher wages and non-wage benefits are paid (it is so-called “objective” gap). 
However, on the adjusted basis several objective reasons may ground the existence 
of the part-time pay gap. From the employers’ side quasi-fixed costs and differences 
in productivity and accumulated human capital are often emphasized. 
Existence of quasi-fixed costs. From the employers’ view, the reason for the part-
time wage penalty is often grounded by the existence of the quasi-fixed costs, i.e. 
costs that are proportional to the number of employed rather than hours worked (for 120
example hiring costs, training costs, administrative costs, monitoring costs, 
coordinating costs, etc). As in the “good” jobs (i.e. the jobs where wage and bonuses 
are higher) the hiring and training costs are higher, employers prefer to employ full-
time rather than part-time person to the position to get the maximum benefit from 
the investments made (Montgomery 1988). According to Rosen (1976), in case the 
position is filled with part-time worker, the fixed costs would entail lower hourly 
wage ceteris paribus.
Lower productivity of the part-time workers. According to Barzel (1973), the 
productivity of the worker fluctuates during the working day: in the beginning of the 
day, the productivity is lower than daily average, and then starts to increase 
gradually. In the last hour of the working day the productivity of the full-time 
worker is higher than average. Therefore, if the length of the working day is shorter, 
the wage should be lower. 
Lower accumulation of the on-the-job human capital. If the productivity of the 
worker is determined mainly by the on-the-job experience rather than working 
experience in general, the lower wages of the part-time workers are well grounded 
because with the same tenure in years of the particular job they acquire less human 
capital (and are therefore less productive) than full-time employed (Hirsch 2005; 
Blank 1998; Manning, Robinson 2004). Russo and Hassink (2008) have found the 
empirical rationale to the statement using the Dutch data: according to the results of 
the study, among youth the wages of the part-time and full-time employed are equal; 
however, for the elderly the substantial part-time wage gap exists. 
Lower level of human capital. According to classical human capital theory, the level 
of individual’s human capital is positively correlated with the potential wage; in 
turn, as individual’s wage increases, he/she will increase the desired number of 
working hours in the labour market (presuming that leisure time is normal good).  
The most important supply-side determinant causing part-time penalty pointed out in 
most studies is segmentation of the labour market. According to this theory there are 
several segments in the labour market that prefer part-time jobs to full-time jobs. 
Three groups most often found to have strong preferences toward part-time 
participation are women, youth and elderly. For women (especially if they have 
small children) the part-time working provides a good possibility to reconcile the 
work and family responsibilities. Youth prefer part-time work because it enables 
them to flexibly combine participation in the labour market with studying. Elderly 
prefer part-time jobs due to the health conditions: while it may be too strenuous for 
the elderly to work full-time, they do not want to entirely exit the labour market and 
part-time working gives them an opportunity to optimally adjust their needs with the 
constraints stemming from the bad health condition. As the aforementioned 
individuals have clear preferences regarding the timing of working, employers are in 
a better bargaining position when determining their wages and may therefore offer 
those segments lower wages pro rata.121
Another supply-side factor emphasized is the geographic segmentation. According 
to Ermish and Wright (1993), the supply of part-time workers may have a 
geographic dimension because part-time workers are disproportionately less than 
full-time employed willing to pay commuting costs. Moreover, their labour supply is 
less elastic than full-time employed because for them it is much more convenient to 
combine the family responsibilities and participation in the labour market when 
employer is easily accessible from their home. In case the employer exercises the 
monopsony power in the local labour market, the profit maximization requires 
paying the part-timers a lower wage than full-timers as their bargaining position is 
more unfavourable.
There are also explanations provided to explain the part-time wage premium 
observed in several studies; one of these concerns fluctuations in workload. On the 
contrary to the compensation theory, when employers have preferences concerning 
the working time, employees are in the better bargaining position and may therefore 
demand higher wages pro rata. Therefore in sectors where certain fluctuations in 
demand (for example during the working day or seasonally) exist and employers 
hire additional part-time workers to better meet the needs of demand, part-time 
workers may have enough bargaining power to demand a higher hourly wages than 
full-time employed. To conclude, in the sectors where the timing of the workload is 
fluctuating (ie primarily certain service sector jobs, for example sales workers, 
tellers, etc) part-time employed are more productive because they do not spend some 
time of the working day idle. Therefore, their wage should be higher.  
3. Data, variables and raw pay gap 
The extent of the part-time employment has been relatively stable in Estonia in 
recent years. While it is comparable to the average of new member states (EU10), 
fluctuating between 6.5-8%, the figure is much lower than in EU15 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The extent of part-time employment in European Union. (Eurostat)122
The general national standard for working time of employees is eight hours per day 
or forty hours per week in Estonia. According to Estonian Working and Rest Time 
Act, part-time working time is working time determined by an employer which is 
shorter than the established standard for working time and which is applied by 
agreement between an employee and the employer. Statistics Estonia defines part-
time worker as employed person whose usual working time is lower than the 
comparable full-time employed. As the aforementioned definitions are too general 
and do not give any information how much shorter the working time should be, we 
follow the specification used by Statistics Estonia in Labour Force Survey 
(hereinafter  ELFS) methodology: a part-time employee is an employed person 
whose usual working time per week is less than 35 hours.  
However, there are several occupations provided in Working and Rest Time Act, 
whose full-time working hours are less than national standard:  
x employees who perform underground work, work that poses a health hazard or 
work of a special nature - seven hours per day or thirty-five hours per week; 
x teachers and educators working in schools and other child care institutions, and 
other persons working in the area of education, and psychologists and speech 
therapists working on the basis of employment contracts entered into with a 
provider of health care services - seven hours per day or thirty-five hours per 
week.
Our analysis is based on the Estonian Labour Force Survey (hereinafter also ELFS) 
data, which is a nationally representative random-sample panel survey of 
individuals. ELFS is appropriate for analysing the problem at hand as it contains 
information about working hours and pay in the main job as well as a rich set of 
other individual and job specific controls that are likely to affect wages. The first 
wave in 1995 was based on the 1989 census database and the later waves on the data 
from the population register. 1997-2000 the survey was arranged as an annual cross-
section (see also Leping and Toomet 2008). Since 2000 the survey has been 
organised quarterly as a rotating panel sample: each individual is surveyed 2 
quarters, then not observed sequent 2 quarters, and thereafter again surveyed for 2 
quarters. The sample comprises of the permanent residents of Estonia at the age 15-
74 years. Until 2000 the survey included also the retrospective data (questions on the 
past labour market experience) in addition to the data of the survey week. 
ELFS contains a question “Why are you employed part-time”. Those employed who 
report that in their job less than 35-hour working week is considered to be full-time 
employment, are defined as full-time rather than part-time employed in our study. As 
Figure 2 indicates, the proportions of the full-time and part-time according to our 
data and Eurostat overlap almost one-to-one, indicating that there are no major 
errors.123
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Figure 2. The proportion of part-time workers in Estonia according to ELFS and 
Eurostat data. (Own calculations based on Estonian LFS data and Eurostat)
The analysis covers the long time period: 1997-2007. In total there are 264,303 
observations in the database, 12,585 part-time and 129,101 full-time employed. We 
estimate all models separately by gender as it is inappropriate to pool them given 
that the reasons for part-time employment differ between males and females. In our 
analysis we have used only the data on the survey week as only for the survey week 
it is possible to calculate the part-time status in the way that we have specified it 
above. As explanatory variables, we use different individual-specific and job-related 
characteristics. 
The data describing the incidence of part-time employment indicates that the trends 
in Estonia are in line with the results of the other countries. Part-time work is much 
more popular among youth and elderly (when compared to middle-aged), in primary 
and tertiary sector (compared to secondary) and for those engaged with studies 
(compared to non-students). The number of small kids in the household motivates 
females to work part-time (especially in recent years) and males to work full-time. 
For the older children the effect is somewhat more modest for both genders. Unlike 
the results of the several studies, the comparison of the raw data does not strongly 
support the hypothesis that the marital status affects the females’ decision to work 
part-time. However, cohabitating men tend to work full-time rather than part-time 
which indicates that in Estonia the men breadwinner tendency may hold. Somewhat 
interestingly, both men and women with primary and higher education tend to work 
part-time, while secondary educated are more frequently employed full-time. 124
The analysis of the raw wage gap indicates that for females there is on the hourly 
basis a part-time premium observable for the whole period in Estonia (see Figure 3). 
However, the scale of the wage gap has not been constant. In the beginning and in 
the end of the period under observation, the wages of the part-time and full-time 
employed females are almost equal, while in the middle of the period remarkable 
differences are observable. The part-time premium peaked in 2000 when the 
unemployment was at the highest levels due to structural changes in Estonian 
economy induced by Russian crisis.
Figure 3. Average wages of part-time and full-time employed by gender in Estonia 
1994-2007. (Own calculations based on Estonian LFS data) 
Females
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Part-time
Full-time
Males
0
50
100
150
200
250
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Part-time
Full-time125
On the contrary to females, for males the trend has turned over. In the beginning of 
the period, on the hourly basis only a modest part-time premium was observable. 
During the Russian crisis in the late nineties, a more substantial part-time premium 
appeared. The difference was the highest in 1998, when the extensive changes 
occurred in Estonian labour market. In 1999 the differences remained, but decreased 
to some extent. Year 2000, when the hourly wages of full-time and part-time 
employed males were almout identical, can be considered as a turning point. Since 
2001 the males employed part-time have earned in absolute terms less than full-time 
employed. It is interesting to analyze whether the differences remain when we take 
into account ceteris paribus effect. 
The information about wage gap by selected worker categories and gender are 
provided in Table 1. On unadjusted basis, for women in all education categories the 
substantial part-time premium occurs. For men, however, part-time premium is 
observable only for tertiary educated. The situation is similar when the comparison 
between different sectors is made: whereas for women in all sectors the gap exists 
and is especially large in tertiary sector, for men the same holds only for secondary 
sector, where the proportion of employed working part-time is the lowest. For white-
collar females, the raw part-time premium is almost twice as high as for blue-collar 
workers. On the contrary, for white-collar males the part-time wage penalty is 
double of the level of the blue-collar workers. While the wages of the Estonians are 
higher than for non-Estonians, the part-time premium for the latter is much higher 
than for Estonians. 
From demand-side indicators, we used in our analysis the size and ownership status 
of the enterprise. There appears to be two company categories (50-199 employed 
and more than 500 employed) where the substantial part-time premium is observable 
for both males and females. In other groups the premium is somewhat modest for 
females and part-time pay gap occurs for males. 
In state-owned enterprises on the hourly basis both part-time working men and 
women are remunerated higher than full-time employed; for females, however, the 
effect is much more substantial than for males. For females, in private companies the 
part-time premium is smaller than in state-owned enterprises; for males in private-
owned companies a part-time wage penalty occurs. The same results apply when 
wages by ownership status (domestic versus foreign-owned) are considered: for 
females part-time premium occurs in both categories; for foreign-owned enterprises 
the effect is smaller than in domestic companies. For males, in domestic companies 
the wages of the part-time and full-time employed are equal; in foreign-owned 
companies, however, a substantial part-time wage gap is observable. T
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4. Econometric methods 
To estimate the wage differences between part-time and full-time employed we use 
two econometric approaches: direct method and propensity score matching. 
According to direct method, separate wage equations are estimated for part-time and 
full-time employed (Bardasi and Gornick 2000): 
(1)   pt pt pt X pt w H E  c   log ,
(2)   ft ft ft X ft w H E  c   log ,
where  wpt ja wft are (gross) wages of the part-time and full-time employed, 
respectively;  Xpt ja Xft are vectors of explanatory variables in the regression 
equations for the part-time and full-time persons, respectively; Ept ja Eft are vectors 
of the estimated parameters of the part-time and full-time wage equations, 
respectively;  İpt ja İft are the error terms of the part-time and full-time wage 
equations, respectively (normally distributed, with mean zero and standard 
deviations pt V  and  ft V ).
Usually ordinary least squares method with White (1980) standard error correction is 
used to estimate the parameters of the equations (1) and (2). However, due to the 
research problem it is quite likely that there exists the problem of selection (because 
people select into part-time/full-time employment status non-randomly). Therefore, 
is several studies (for example Hardoy, Schone 2006) Heckman (1979) two-step 
estimation strategy is used to estimate the parameters of the wage equations (1) and 
(2) (but not in this article). After estimating the parameters, Oaxaca (1973) and 
Blinder (1973) methods can be employed to decompose the wage differentials into 
price effects and characteristics effects (for further details, see O’Dorchai et al.
2007). In particular, the wage gap can be decomposed into two parts: 
 (3)          pt ft pt X ft pt X ft X pt w ft w E E E       log log , 
where  ) log(w  is the average log hourly gross wage and  X  is the vector of the 
mean values of explanatory variables. The first part in the right hand side of the 
regression equation describes the explained part of the wage gap, i.e. the part of the 
wage gap that is due to the differences in observable characteristics between part-
timers and full-timers; that is also called “endowment effect”. The second term is the 
part of the wage gap that is caused by the differences in returns to observable 
characteristics; the term is often referred to as the price effect. Although it is often 
considered as the discrimination component, it also includes all potential effects in 
differences due to unobserved variables (Jann 2008). One decision to be made in 
case of the wage decomposition is the choice of the reference category (the category 
for which no discrimination occurs, Jann 2008). Though sometimes the full-time 
category is used in this place, in principle the part-time pay gap can be both positive 
and negative as we discussed earlier, so other options would be more appropriate, 
like using the coefficients from pooled regressions over both groups with the part-
time. In our calculations we used the Oaxaca command for Stata developed by Jann 129
(2008); at the place of the reference coefficients the coefficients from the pooled 
model over both samples were used with pooled model containing a group 
membership indicator (i.e. the part-time dummy). In the explained part, also the 
contribution of each regression variable to the wage gap can be distinguished. 
In addition to traditional econometric methods, we also use propensity score 
matching to estimate the wage gap between part-time and full-time employed. While 
initially used mainly in medicine to evaluate the treatment effects of the drugs, the 
scope of the application of propensity score matching (developed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983) has widened substantially in past decade in economic studies, too. 
The general idea of the propensity score matching is to evaluate the treatment effects 
(in our case the “treatement” is the employment status: part-time versus full-time). 
Although according to the information available to authors, the method has not been 
used for analyzing part-time/full-time wage differentials so far, it has been employed 
to analyze gender wage differentials (Frölich 2007) and union-nonunion wage gap 
(Eren 2007). 
In propensity score matching, it is assumed that following equation (known as 
conditional independence assumption, CIA) applies: 
(4)     X D Y E X D Y E , 0 0 , 1 0       , i.e.  X D Y A 0 ,
where Y0 denotes the outcome variable, X is the vector of the observable variables, D
is the treatment (1 if part-time, 0 if full-time employed). 
The main advantage of the propensity score matching lies in the fact that the method 
enables to correct the selection bias while not making any strict assumptions about 
the functional form between outcome and explanatory variables. However, like any 
other matching procedures, propensity score matching has a certain limitations that 
should be kept in mind when making conclusions. Most importantly, like any other 
matching methods, PSM cannot match unmeasured contextual variables that may be 
important when determining the selection into treatment and control group (i.e. 
remaining hidden bias may be substantial, especially in cases when the treatment 
and control group do not have a substantial overlap). 
There are several matching algorithms available (for more detailed overview, please 
refer to Caliendo and Kopeinig 2005). Basically in applying each of them involves a 
trade-off between bias and variance. In nearest neighborhood (NN) matching, the 
matching partner for each treatment group member from the comparison group is 
chosen to have the most similar propensity score. There are several NN matching 
methods developed, e.g. 
x 1-to-1 NN matching (in this case only one matching partner with closest 
propensity score is chosen for each treated) and 1-to-n NN matching (N 
matching partners are chosen for each treated, the distance is calculated as an 
average); 
x with replacement (each control group member can be used more than once as a 
match) and without replacement (each untreated can be used as a match only 
once).130
In addition to NN matching, in the current study we also employ non-parametric 
kernel-based matching approach. Unlike the most of other PSM methods, kernel 
matching use weighed averages of all control group individuals when constructing 
the counterfactual outcome. The main advantage of the method is the lower variance 
due to the larger amount of information used. The major possible drawback is the 
scope of the bias caused by the bad matches. For the implementation of the 
propensity score matching we used the program psmatch2 developed by Leuven and 
Sianesi (2003). 
5. Part-time/full-time wage gap estimates 
5.1. Direct method and Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions 
We start the review of the econometric modeling results with Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition results. Naturally, all estimations have been made separately for men 
and women. The decompositions were made separately for different years as well as 
by taking different years together into 3 periods (1997-2000, 2001-2004, 2005-
2007). This option was used also, because due to the relatively low frequency of 
part-time employment in Estonia there are not many part-timers in certain worker 
categories in a given year (e.g. among small firms, certain occupation, narrowly 
defined industry, etc.), thus parameter estimates could be become unstable and 
insignificant. Four different models were estimated, firstly only with constant term 
and year dummies (model 1), then with human capital variables (education, tenure at 
current job, model 2), additional controls like location, firm size, ownership 
dummies (model 3), and finally including also 9 occupational dummies (model 4). 
The list of control variables is based on earlier studies and is fairly standard. Due to 
the large number of different regressions estimated, we do not present the 
coefficients of all of these, but only for the model with the full set of control 
variables estimated on the sample where different years have been taken together 
(the parameters are not presented in the article, but are available from authors upon 
request). The parameters are mostly significant and with expected values, e.g. wages 
are higher in case of higher education, longer tenure, in capital area, larger firms, 
foreign owner firms, certain occupations. Differences between the parameters for 
full-timers and part-timers will be described below. For instance, previous evidence 
has shown that during part-time employment the accumulation of human capital is 
lower (i.e. there are very low returns to tenure). Although the returns to tenure are 
lower also among part-timers in our data, in Estonia especially in the beginning of 
transition tenure used to be relatively less important determinant of wages. 
For females, the Figure 4 presents the decomposition results over years, while in 
Table 2 years have been aggregated into 3 periods. The results show that in all of the 
years and periods the observed wage-gap is negative, i.e. part-time employees earn 
more than the full-time employees; however, the wage gap is decreasing over time. 
The size of the gap varies from 20% to less than 5%. Part of the story could be either 
improved macroeconomic conditions that created labour shortage, thus the firms 
agree to higher part-time workers at relatively higher wages. Yet another explanation 
could be related to the introduction of the parental compensation since 2002 
allowing one of the parents (usually, however, mothers use it) to stay at home for 15 131
months at the previous wage earned before parental leave, that may decrease labour 
supply at part-time positions during parental leave, however that would rather 
increase wage gap in favour of part-timers. 
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Figure 4. Unexplained wage gap in favour of full-time employees in case of females 
in Estonia.
As we can see, including more variables in the regression equation widens the wage 
gap, i.e. the unexplained wage gap is even larger when we control for various 
characteristics. Thus, part-timers are worse endowed regarding the characteristics 
controlled in the regressions, than the full-timers. For instance, relatively many of 
them have only basic education, or the proportion of part-timers is highest among 
the lowest-paying occupational group, elementary occupations. If we control for that 
worse endowment of part-timers, the wage gap thus increases.  
The contribution of different factors to explaining the part-time wag gap is quite 
different, as we can see from Table 4. The most important ones are firm ownership, 
firm size and especially occupation, human capital variables are relatively 
unimportant. For instance as we saw, the percentage of part-timers is rather low in 
foreign owned firms, however these firms have on the average much higher wages. 
The wage-gap in favour of part-timers comes also from the occupational group 
“professionals” (that has the 2nd highest proportion of part-timers and in each period 
wage gap in favour of part-timers). Quite important indicator is the firm size – the 
proportion of part-timers is much higher among small firms (especially those with 
less than 50 employees) that have lower pay among full-timers. However, these are 
also the groups that have higher wages among part-timers while among the large 
firms the difference is much smaller. From here it is clear why controlling for firm-
size has widened the gap in favour of part-timers – especially in conditions where 132
full-time employees have lower pay part-timers earn relatively more. The 
explanations for the lower pay among smaller firms is explained e.g. by the costs of 
employee monitoring, capital-skill complementarity and the complementarity 
between labour skills and advanced technology capital (Troske 1994). Concerning 
different sectors, part-timers are more often employed in the following industries: 
education, real estate, renting and business activities (i.e. part of business services), 
and other industries. Among these three, the positive wage gap in favour of part-
timers is the largest in education. 
Table 2. Estimated wage gaps and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, by periods, 
female
Year  Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Full-time 4.39  4.39  4.39  4.39 
Part-time 4.43  4.43 4.43 4.43 
Wage gap  -0.04  -0.04  -0.05  -0.05 
Explained  0   0.01   0.02***   0.05***  
Years together 
Unexplained  -0.04***   -0.05***  -0.07***   -0.1***  
Full-time 3.9  3.9  3.91  3.91 
Part-time 3.95  3.95 3.95 3.95 
Wage gap  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05 
Explained  0   -0.01  0  0.05***  
19972000 
Unexplained  -0.05**   -0.04   -0.05**  -0.1***  
Full-time 4.21  4.21  4.21  4.21 
Part-time 4.28  4.28 4.28 4.28 
Wage gap  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 
Explained  0   0   0.01   0.03***  
20002004 
Unexplained  -0.08***   -0.07***  -0.08***   -0.1*** 
Full-time 4.73  4.73  4.73  4.73 
Part-time 4.75  4.75 4.76 4.76 
Wage gap  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
Explained -0.01  0.01*  0.03*** 0.06*** 
20032007 
Unexplained -0.01    -0.03***  -0.06***  -0.1*** 
Year dummies    X X X X 
Human capital    X  X  X 
Other controls      X  X 
Occupation    X 
Note. * significant at 10%; ** significant at % ; *** significant at 1 %. 
For males the picture is rather different (see Table 3 and Figure 5). In case of males, 
the wage gap is negative till 2000, and positive thereafter (meaning that full-time 
employees earn more); the magnitude of the gap is up to 25 percent (in 2006). Some 
pro-cyclical pattern can be noticed in the wage gap – the wage gap was growing 
during 2004-2006, the period of strong macroeconomic growth, while much smaller 133
in 1999 (the time of the economic downturn caused by the Russian crises) and 
decreased also in 2007, when the economic growth started to decelerate. The 
explanation could be that during the times of strong growth there was a labour 
shortage, so employers rather may have preferred to employ workers on the full time 
basis. On the other hand, concerning economic downturns, there is some anecdotal 
evidence that people previously working full-time and being moved to part-time 
basis start earning somewhat higher hourly wages. 
Table 3. Estimated wage gaps and Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, by periods, 
males
Year Wage  variable  Model  1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Full-time 4.65  4.65  4.63  4.63 
Part-time 4.42  4.42 4.42 4.42 
Wage gap  0.23  0.23  0.21  0.21 
Explained 0.05***    0.07***    0.09***   0.14***  
Years together 
Unexplained  0.17***   0.16***   0.11***   0.07***  
Full-time 4.16  4.16  4.16  4.16 
Part-time 4.06  4.06 4.06 4.06 
Wage  gap  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Explained  0  0   0.04*   0.09***  
19972000 
Unexplained  0.1**   0.1**   0.06) 0.01   
Full-time 4.44  4.44  4.43  4.43 
Part-time 4.26  4.26 4.26 4.26 
Wage gap  0.18  0.18  0.17  0.17 
Explained 0.01    0.03***  0.05***   0.08***  
20002004 
Unexplained  0.17***   0.15***  0.12***   0.09***  
Full-time 5.03  5.03  5.01  5.01 
Part-time 4.8  4.8 4.81  4.81 
Wage gap  0.23  0.23  0.2  0.2 
Explained 0.01  0.03**    0.05***   0.12*** 
20032007 
Unexplained  0.22***   0.2***   0.15***   0.08*** 
Year dummies   X  X  X  X 
Human capital     X  X  X 
Other controls       X  X 
Occupation        X 134
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Figure 5. Unexplained wage gap in favour of full-time employees for males in 
Estonia.
Concerning the importance of different factors (see Table 4), as we can see, human 
capital variables explain almost nothing of the part-time pay gap. One reason could 
be that as we saw also from the descriptive tables, among part-timers there are a 
relatively higher proportion of people with either primary or higher education, while 
among full-time employees there are a higher proportion of people with secondary 
education. When the model is extended with other controls, the explained part of the 
wage gap increases to about 70% of the total gap that is more similar to earlier 
studies. In align with earlier studies, occupation is rather important – adding the 
dummies for 9 occupational categories increases the explained share of wage gap 
almost twice (up to 60-70%). Concerning different years, the wage gap was negative 
until 2000 (i.e. part-time employees earned more till that time), and positive 
thereafter. The story then seems to be that male working part-time are occupied in 
positions with generally lower pay; differently, the within occupational group wage 
gap is significantly smaller than the overall wage gap. The descriptive data shows 
that the proportion of part-timers is only slightly higher at white-collar occupations 
relative to blue-collar occupations (during 2004-2006 6% versus 4.5%); however, 
closer look reveals that they are quite overrepresented among elementary 
occupations, that have the lowest wage in the white-collar group. In terms of firm 
size, part-timers are more frequently employed in smaller firms that have lower pay 
among full-timers. Concerning industries, the most frequent industries are somewhat 
different, these are education, hotels and restaurants and other. The results on the 
detailed decomposition results indicate that the factors most important for explaining 
the part-time wage gap are similar to those observed in case of females, namely firm 135
size, firm ownership, occupation, reflecting that part-timers work more often in 
smaller firms, domestic firms and occupations like, where pay is usually lower. 
Table 4. The importance of different factors in accounting for part-time pay penalty 
or premium as percentage of the explained wage gap
Year  Variable  Model 4, females  Model 4, males 
Explained 0.1  0.1 
Education -2.2  5 
Tenure 9.7  4.5 
Sector 0.3  -2.1 
Region -10.5  1.7 
Firm size  36.9 20.7 
Firm owner  26.7 15.1 
Occupation 51.1 31.3 
Nationality -16.7  -9.1 
Union membership  0.7  0.9 
Years together 
Year dummies  4.1  31.9 
What could be the reasons for the part-time wage penalty being positive in case of 
men and negative in case of female? Russo and Hassink (2008) explained that in 
case of Netherlands with either men being more permanently earned on part-time 
basis and women switching between part-time and full time employment, and 
secondly, by the part-time employment being used more often in case of men as a 
screening device (e.g. to decide about promotions). 
5.2. Propensity Score Matching 
When applying the propensity score matching to analyse part-time/full-time wage 
gap in Estonia, following approach was used for each year and males/females 
separately. Firstly, the propensity score for each person was found using the probit 
model. Due to the small sample size, it is highly likely that the results are sensitive 
to the matching procedure applied. Therefore three different matching algorithms 
were used: gaussian kernel, epanechnikov kernel (default in psmatch2 command for 
Stata with kernel matching) and nearest neighbourhood matching (5 nearest 
neighbours from the control group were used as matching partners). 
For females (see Table 5), in all years similar to raw wage gaps the statistically 
significant part-time premium is observable on the adjusted basis. The scope of the 
differences, however, varies according to matching method used. However, the 
average treatment effects of the different methods are quite similar in most years, 
results found using epanechnikov kernel and NN matching are very close (except in 
2007) and Gaussian kernel gives estimates for the ATT somewhat higher than the 
results found by applying the other two methods. The scope of the wage differences 
shows no clear trend; however during the Russian crisis the part-time premium was 136
higher than for the rest of the period. For most of the years we can see that similarly 
to the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions, after considering various factors the wage 
gap becomes even more extensive. 
Table 5. Unmatched and matched wage differences by different propensity score 
matching methods for females (t-statistics in parentheses) 
ATT for various matching algorithms  Year Unmatched  wage 
difference  Kernel
(Epanechnikov) 
Kernel
(Gaussian)
1-to-5 NN 
1994  -3.1 (-2.36)  -5.0 (-2.75)  -3.8 (-1.60)  -4.9 (-2.47) 
1995  -11.6 (-6.45)  -13.2 (-4.90)  -10.6 (-2.42)  -12.9 (-4.43) 
1996  -6.75 (-2.16)  -8.7 (-2.23)  -7.8 (-1.70)  -8.7 (-2.08) 
1997  -14.65 (-9.73)  -16.8 (-5.26)  -17.1 (-4.89)  -17.6 (-5.42) 
1998  -11.8 (-9.95)  -13.1 (-6.10)  -13.4 (-5.28)  -12.3 (-5.52) 
1999  -17.2 (-10.38)  -17.9 (-5.66)  -16.9 (-4.52)  -17.0 (-5.20) 
2000  -26.1 (-10.58)  -23.2 (-4.62)  -19.8 (-3.58)  -21.3 (-4.16) 
2001  -5.1 (-2.30)  -4.2 (-1.58)  -6.9 (-1.78)  -6.3 (-2.14) 
2002  -13.8 (-5.29)  -11.4 (-2.91)  -13.8 (-5.29)  -10.5 (-2.52) 
2003  -10.9 (-4.22)  -10.7 (-3.55)  -10.4 (-2.38)  -11.1 (-3.27) 
2004  -8.1 (-2.96)  -8.6 (-2.81)  -6.1 (-1.22)  -8.2 (-2.36) 
2005  -12.2 (-3.71)  -13.1 (-2.94)  -11.2 (-2.01)  -14.5 (-3.06) 
2006  -9.8 (-2.86)  -15.8 (-3.79)  -22.3 (-3.98)  -17.0 (-3.61) 
2007  -6.8 (-1.84)  -17.5 (-3.77)  -11.3 (-1.48)  -13.8 (-2.66) 
As we can see from Table 6, for the first half of the period, the part-time premium is 
observable for males in Estonia. The scope of the premium shows no clear trend, 
fluctuating year to year. On the contrary, since 2001 in most years the part-time 
penalty is observable. However, the values of the t-statistics indicate that the 
differences between part-time and full-time working men are in most years not 
statistically significant, most likely due to the small sample size. In most cases the 
ATT is smaller than the raw pay gap. That is in accordance with out earlier 
decomposition results – part time wage gap tends to decrease significantly once the 
differences in the part-time and full-time employers are taken into account. 
However, during the Russian crisis statistically significant part-time premium is 
observable for males. Possible reason for this tendency may lie in the fact that when 
due to the deteriorated economic conditions in the companies shortened working 
time was used (the same tendency is observable at the moment, i.e. 2008), the 
working hours of the employed were reduce more than the wage. 137
Table 6. Unmatched and matched wage differences by different propensity score 
matching methods (males; t-statistics in parentheses) 
ATT for various matching algorithms  Year Unmatched  wage 
difference  Kernel
(Epanechnikov) 
Kernel
(Gaussian)
1-to-5 NN 
1994  -6.3 (-1.82)  -9.3 (-1.88)  -9.8 (-1.84)  -11.0 (-2.21) 
1995  -12.5 (-3.48)  -15.0 (-1.71)  -9.7 (-1.03)  -14.0 (-1.60) 
1996  -9.0 (-1.57)  -11.1 (-0.92)  -17.5 (-1.42)  -9.4 (-0.79) 
1997  -7.4 (-2.79)  -9.6 (-2.26)  -5.4 (-0.83)  -9.8 (-2.12) 
1998  -26.9 (-6.71)  -29.7 (-2.11)  -34.8 (-2.43)  -31.6 (-2.23) 
1999  -12.8 (-4.49)  -16.8 (-3.46)  -15.7 (-2.62)  -16.4 (-3.24) 
2000  -3.3 (-0.74)  -6.8 (-1.33)  -3.1 (-0.37)  -5.2 (-0.92) 
2001  11.7 (2.31)  7.6 (1.43)  6.1 (0.78)  8.8 (1.59) 
2002  7.0 (1.31)  9.4 (1.66)  15.4 (1.38)  10.1 (1.50) 
2003  3.4 (0.56)  -4.2 (-0.42)  6.1 (0.53)  -7.7 (-0.74) 
2004  23.0 (3.57)  13.6 (2.44)  9.0 (1.00)  6.9 (1.04) 
2005  24.5 (2.85)  8.3 (0.93)  24.0 (1.90)  12.8 (1.24) 
2006  22.7 (2.52)  3.5 (0.26)  -17.9 (-1.06)  -2.23 (-0.16) 
2007  12.9 (1.30)  5.0 (0.40)  -1.6 (-0.10)  -6.6 (-0.50) 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we studied the wage gap between the pay of part-timers and full-timers 
by using the Estonian Labour Force Survey data from years 1997-2007. The wage 
gap was firstly estimated from the wage regressions using Oaxaca-Blinder 
decompositions and thereafter and propensity score matching technique. As 
explanatory variables, we used various human capital variables, firm size, regional 
and occupation dummies et cetera. Given that the reasons for part-time work differ 
considerable between male and female employees, all regressions and calculations 
were separately estimated for these two groups. 
The results were quite different for males and females. For females the raw wage 
gap was in favour of part-timers, i.e. the part-time employees earned in different 
periods about 5-20% more than full-timers. After taking into account various worker 
characteristics, the difference did not vanish but even enlarged, i.e. part-timers are 
with less favourable labour market characteristics (i.e. work more often in small 
firms with low pay), thus the unexplained part of the wage gap is larger than the raw 
wage gap. In case of men, part-timers earned more than full-timers before year 2000, 
but since then the pay of full-timers have been larger, and the wage gap grew to 25% 
in 2006. Differently from women, the part-time wage gap of male was to large 
extent explained by various variables, most important of which were the dummies 
for different occupational groups, firm size groups and firms with different owners 
(similar factors were important also in case of female). Thus, the results that in the 138
matching estimations only the pay gap of the women turns out to be statistically 
significant, is not only due to the much smaller frequency about the part-time 
employment among men, but also because in case of male the gap can be explained 
by differences in endowments between part-timers and full-timers, while not so in 
case of the female. 
The study needs to be developed in several directions in order to fully understand 
the nature of part-time gap in our data. Firstly, we need to control for the non-
random selection into part-time employment. Secondly, voluntary and non-voluntary 
part-timers can have rather different pay-gap. The previous evidence has showed 
that in Estonia among the part-timers relatively more are involuntarily while in 
Western European countries most part/timers are voluntary (Krillo et al. 2007). 
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